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Fierle v. Perez, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 36 (Nov 19, 2009)1
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND NRS 41A.071’S
EXPERT AFFIDAVIT REQUIREMENT
Summary
An appeal from the First Judicial District Court’s dismissal of medical malpractice and
professional negligence claims against a physician, his professional medical corporation and
several staff members for failure to attach an expert affidavit to their initial complaint.
Disposition/Outcome
District court’s judgment affirmed with regards to claims that required an affidavit,
reversed and remanded with regards to claim that qualified under res ipsa loquitor exceptions.
Facts and Procedural History
Patricia Fierle (“Fierle”) was diagnosed in July 2005 with breast cancer and subsequently
underwent a mastectomy. To facilitate ongoing chemotherapy, a catheter was inserted into her
chest, the tip of which was meant to terminate in her subclavian vein. Chemotherapy drugs were
to be injected into the vein through this catheter.
After the surgery, Fierle became a patient of Dr. Perez and his staff, including Melissa
Mitchell (“Mitchell”), a registered nurse, and nurse practitioners Charmaine Cruet and Linda
Lesperance. On Fierle’s third visit to Dr. Perez’ office, Mitchell administered chemotherapy.
However, rather than in fusing in to the catheter, the medication infused into her tissue. This
caused a subcutaneous burn known as an “extravasation.” According to Fierle, her complaints of
discomfort at the time were not met with any treatment or attention.
The next day, after one of Dr. Perez’ nurses noticed redness and swelling on Fierle’s
chest, she was referred to a radiologist. His tests revealed that the tip of the catheter was not in
the vein, but coiled in her tissue. She then sought treatment from another doctor who referred her
to Dr. Miercort. His opinion was that “negligent extravasation” had occurred and he referred her
to U.C. Davis Medical Center. There, she was diagnosed with “severe extravasation of
chemotherapy over the right shoulder and subclavian region.”
Mr. and Mrs. Fierle filed a complaint in district court on September 14, 2006. They
claimed Mitchell was negligent in her administration of chemotherapy, Dr. Perez, Cruet and
Lesperance were negligent in their training of Mitchell, loss of consortium and “Willful Failure
to Provide Treatment and Constructive Fraud” against Dr. Perez and his professional medical
corporation Jorge Perez M.D., Ltd. They later amended their complaint to include an affidavit
from Dr. Miercort.
Dr. Perez, Jorge Perez M.D., Ltd., and Mitchell moved for dismissal of the Fierles’
complaint, citing failure to include an expert affidavit with the original complaint as required by
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NRS 41A.071. 2 They also moved to strike the amended complaint, relying on Nevada precedent
that said a complaint filed under NRS 41A.071 without the expert affidavit is void ab initio and
shall be dismissed. 3 These motions were joined by Cruet and Lesperance. The district court
granted both motions, finding that the complaints did not qualify for NRS 41A.100(1)(c)’s res
ipsa loquitor exception. The Fierles’ motions under NRCP 52(b), 59(e) and 60(b) were also later
denied. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Standard of Review
The district court’s dismissal was based on its interpretation of statutes. The Nevada
Supreme Court reviews a district court’s statutory interpretation de novo. 4
NRS 41A.071 applies to professional medical corporations
Under NRS 41A.071, an action for medical or dental malpractice must be accompanied
by an affidavit from a medical expert who practices a type of medicine similar to that which
forms the basis of the malpractice claim. 5 NRS 41A.009 contains the following definition for
medical malpractice: “the failure of a physician, hospital or employee of a hospital, in rendering
services, to use reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar
circumstances.” 6 The appellants argued that no affidavit is required under these statutes in a suit
against a professional medical corporation.
While the definition of medical malpractice does not explicitly include professional
medical corporations, the Court held that NRS 41A.071 requires expert affidavits be attached to
any non res ipsa loquitor malpractice claim against such a corporation. “Professional
Corporation” is defined in NRS Chapter 89, and under NRS 89.060 and 89.220, no statute can
alter the personal liability of a physician in a medical malpractice claim. 7 Harmonizing Chapters
41A and 89, the Court determined that the affidavit requirement applies to claims against
professional medical corporations as well as physicians.
NRS 41A.071 applies to professional negligence claims
The Fierles’ also argued that the definition of medical malpractice only covers claims
against Dr. Perez’. Therefore, the claims against the other respondents would be for professional
negligence and would not require an affidavit as 41A.071 only addresses malpractice claims. The
Court looked to resolve the ambiguity by looking to the intent of the initiatives passed in 2004 as
NRS 41A.015 and 41A.017, which provided protections for professional negligence for
providers of health care.
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NEV. REV. STAT § 41A.017 (2007).
Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1298, 1300, 148 P.3d 790, 792 (2006).
4
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First, the Court noted that the definition of professional negligence in the statute is
basically the same as medical malpractice. The intent of the statute was to give other providers of
health care the same protection doctors received from the legislature in 2002. 8 The Court also
reasoned that a malpractice claim against a doctor is the same as a professional negligence claim.
To make one of these claims subject to the affidavit requirement and not the other would defeat
the intent of the legislature and the citizens of Nevada. It would provide a way around the
requirement by calling a claim professional negligence instead of malpractice. Therefore, NRS
41A.071’s affidavit requirement extends to non-res ipsa loquitor professional negligence claims
against providers of health care, whether doctors, nurses or nurse practicioners.
Claims based on res ipsa loquitor are not subject to the affidavit requirement
NRS 41A.100 provides res ipsa loquitor exceptions to the affidavit requirement in
malpractice or professional negligence claims. 9 The Court found its recent decision in Szydel v.
Markman conclusive on the issue at hand. 10 In Szydel, the court concluded that that the expert
affidavit requirement does not apply when the malpractice action is based solely on the res ipsa
loquitor doctrine. 11 The Syzdel court further concluded that when a plaintiff files a res ipsa
loquitor claim in conjunction with other medical malpractice claims that are not based upon the
res ipsa loquitor doctrine, those other claims are still subject to the expert affidavit requirements
of NRS 41A.071. 12
Here, the negligent extravasation claim would fall under one of the listed exceptions. If a
“provider of health care” causes a patient to suffer “an unintended burn caused by heat, radiation
or chemicals… in the course of medical care,” or any of the other exceptions listed in the statute,
no expert testimony or affidavit is required to establish negligence. 13 Therefore, the Court
allowed the claim against Mitchell to continue as she administered the medication.
A claim amended to include an affidavit will not relate back to the initial filing even if some of
the claims do not require the affidavit
The appellants next argued that because some of their initial complaint did not require an
affidavit, the amended filing could relate back and cure the initial deficiency. Here, the court
followed precedent and determined that all claims under NRS 41A.071 that do not include an
affidavit are void ab initio, and must be dismissed. 14 The Court applied this rule even to
situations where some claims survive because of lack of an affidavit requirement.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that, because under NRS Chapter 89, the establishment of a
professional entity cannot alter the personal liability of a participant, NRS 41A.071’s affidavit
8
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Id. at 454, 117 P.3d at 201.
12
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requirement applies to claims against professional medical corporations as well as individuals.
The Court further concluded that the requirement extends to professional negligence claims
against all providers of health care, nurse practitioners, nurses and doctors alike. However, the
Court concluded that any claim that falls under the res ipsa loquitor exceptions listed in NRS
41A.100 may be filed without an affidavit as no expert testimony is needed to establish
negligence. Finally, the Court concluded that a complaint filed containing some claims subject to
the affidavit requirement and some that do not fall under 41A.071 cannot be cured by filing an
amended complaint that includes the affidavits. Thus, all claims subject to NRS 41A.071 that are
filed without the affidavits are void ab initio and must be dismissed. In accordance with these
conclusions, the Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s order and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part (Pickering, J.)
Justice Pickering agreed with the result the majority reached, but not with its reasoning.
While medical malpractice is encompassed in the term “professional negligence,” the opposite is
not true. As the amendments in 2004 did not change the words “medical malpractice” in
41A.071 to “professional negligence,” the requirement should not be extended to claims of
professional negligence. However, in this case, Justice Pickering found the injection to be a part
of the rendering of medical services by a physician as defined in the malpractice statute,
regardless of the fact that it was a nurse who physically gave the drugs. Therefore, this action
would be one for medical malpractice and require an affidavit.
Justice Pickering also believes that both the nurse and the physician with the duty to
supervise are subject to the res ipsa loquitor exception. The injection was given by the nurse
under the doctor’s supervision, and therefore the remand should be for Dr. Perez and Mitchell for
the negligent extravasation.

